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Abstract 
Using a Stroop task, we investigated the effect of task irrelevant emotional distractors on 
attentional proactive control and its interaction with trait anxiety. On the basis of recent 
findings showing opposed neural responses in the dorsal-executive vs. the ventral-emotional 
systems in response to emotional distractors and of the Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007), we hypothesized that negative-distractors will result in 
a reduction of proactive task control in the executive system, especially for high trait anxious 
individuals. Using a computational model of the Stroop task we derive two specific 
behavioral predictions of reduced proactive task control: increased Stroop interference and 
reversed Stroop facilitation. Twenty-five high and 25 low trait anxious participants 
completed a Stroop task in which the target stimuli were preceded by brief (neutral vs. 
aversive) emotional distractors. While no effects of picture valence on proactive control was 
found in the low-anxious group, the predicted signatures of reduced proactive control were 
observed in the high anxiety group. These results indicate that trait anxiety influences the 
interaction between irrelevant emotional stimuli and proactive control. 
 
Keywords: Stroop; executive control; emotion; anxiety; task conflict, computational model 
ANXIETY, EMOTIONAL DISTRACTORS AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL         3 
 
Executive control is a key human capacity that enables flexible responding to the 
environment, facilitating goal-directed behavior, unconstrained by automaticity or stimulus-
bound behavior (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Miyake et al., 2000). An important role of the 
executive control system is to filter out (or inhibit) task-irrelevant, often emotional, input 
that interferes with the task at hand. For example, a basketball player taking a free throw 
would do well if he manages to filter out aversive noise coming from the opposition fans ― 
the executive control component serving this function is usually labeled response-inhibition 
(suppressing automatic but irrelevant actions; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008) or task control 
(Braver, 2012; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Another well-known 
component of the executive control system is working memory, a system that regulates the 
maintenance and updating of active representations of information available for use; Banich, 
2009). Research on the impact of task-irrelevant emotional distractors (pictures or words) 
on working-memory and on the response-inhibition component of the executive control 
system portrays a complex picture. While a number of studies have reported that aversive 
(compared with neutral) stimuli interfere with working-memory performance (Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006, Denkova et al., 2010) and with response inhibition in the stop signal 
(Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007) and the Stroop task (Hart, Green, Casp, & Belger, 2010; 
Padmala, Bauer, & Pessoa, 2011), other studies found no effects of emotional distractors in 
the Stroop task and even an opposite direction of causality. For example, in a pilot Stroop 
study using materials similar to those of Hart et al. (2010) 1, we found no significant effects 
of the valence of irrelevant emotional distractors on any of the Stroop measures (see 
Supplementary Material B). Furthermore, in a series of studies, using the Flanker task, 
Cohen, Henik and colleagues reported that in conditions of high conflict (incongruent flanker 
stimuli), participants were immune from the effects of emotional distractors; with such 
effects found only in conditions with low conflict, such as neutral or congruent stimuli. The 
authors explained this result by proposing that incongruent stimuli can engage executive 
processes, which help the observers filter out (or inhibit) the content of the irrelevant 
emotional distractors, making those trials immune from detrimental effects on performance 
outcome(s) (e.g., Cohen, Henik, & Mor, 2011; see also Kalanthroff, Cohen, & Henik, 2013). 
The former results (of reduced cognitive control caused by emotional distractors) are 
consistent with recent findings showing opposed neural responses in the dorsal-executive vs. 
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the ventral-emotional systems in response to emotional distractors in a working memory task 
(Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006, Dolcos, Diaz-Granados, Wang, & McCarthy, 2008; Dolcos, 
Miller, Kragel, Jha, & McCarthy, 2007; ; Iordan, Dolcos & Dolcos, 2013). For examples, a 
number of studies by Dolcos and colleagues have found that “increased activity in the ventral 
affective regions in the presence of emotional distracters, temporarily takes offline the dorsal 
executive system” (Iordan et al., 2013, p. 3).  
One possible source for the variability between studies (in addition to procedural and 
task differences) is the influence of individual differences (Kanske, 2012; Cohen, Henik, & 
Moyal, 2012). The current investigation addresses this issue by examining how the 
interaction between an emotional distractor, administered before a Stroop stimulus is 
presented, and the executive control that is supposed to filter it out, depends on trait anxiety. 
Trait anxiety refers to a general tendency to experience and exhibit anxiety related 
symptomatology and worrisome thoughts over time and across a wide range of situations, 
involving high physiological arousal (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, Jacobs, 1983). 
Many studies have shown that anxiety is associated with a selective attention bias toward 
negatively laden stimuli (for a review see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). According to the Attentional Control Theory (ACT) 
(Berggren & Derakshan, 2013a; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009), anxiety impairs the efficiency of the main functions of the central executive 
system, biasing the attentional system towards bottom-up/stimulus-driven processing. This 
theory is supported by a vast set of accumulating evidence (see Berggren & Derakshan, 
2013a, for a review), indicating that trait anxiety impairs response-inhibition in antisaccade 
(Berggren, Richards, Taylor, & Derakshan, 2013; Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & 
Eysenck, 2009; Ansari & Derakshan, 2010, 2011a, 2011b) and in flanker tasks (Berggren & 
Derakshan, 2013b). Based on this, and on the potential competition between the ventral-
affective system transiently activated by the distracters and the executive control system 
(Iordan et al., 2013; Pessoa, 2009), we predicted that individuals with high trait anxiety will 
resolve this competition in favor of the affective stimuli, resulting in a reduction of proactive 
task-control in the Stroop task. Proactive task-control is an attentional focus to the relevant 
task dimension that is allocated in advance of the stimulus to inhibit automatic (incorrect) 
responses (Braver, 2012). As recently supported by Braver (2012), under conditions of 
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reduced proactive task control, participants need to rely on a reactive control mechanism to 
carry out conflict tasks, such as the Stroop task (see also Kalanthroff, Avnit, Henik, Davelaar, 
& Usher, 2015).  
We start with a brief presentation of an explicit computational model of the Stroop 
task, which allows us to make specific behavioral predictions for the effects of reduced 
proactive control in the Stroop task, which we predict to affect high anxiety participants in 
conditions with negative (emotional) distracters. To preview our computational results, we 
find two specific behavioral signatures of reduced proactive task-control: increased Stroop 
interference and reverse Stroop facilitation (a component that is associated with task conflict; 
Goldfarb & Henik, 2007; Kalanthroff, Goldfarb, & Henik, 2013; Kalanthroff & Henik, 
2013). We then present the experimental study that tests these specific predictions.  
 
A computational model of task-conflict in the Stroop task. 
In recent work, we have shown that reducing proactive task control, via a concurrent 
load manipulation, results in increased task-conflict in the Stroop task, as indicated by a RF 
effect (Kalanthroff et al., 2015; see Berggren et al., 2013 for effects of concurrent load and 
trait anxiety in the antisaccade task). We have provided predictions for this effect using a 
computational model of the Stroop task, which is illustrated in Figure 1 (left panel). This 
proactive-control/task-conflict model assumes a set of task-control units that bias 
information processing toward the relevant task dimension via bilateral connections to the 
input representations (Figure 1, left panel). Due to these bilateral connections, task-demand 
units do not only top-down modulate the processing from input to the response layers, but 
are also activated bottom-up by the input (Stroop-stimuli): words activate the word-reading 
task unit, while colors the color-naming task unit. When both of the task units (i.e., color 
naming and word reading) are (bottom-up) activated, task-conflict emerges (the flash event 
in the figure, computed as the multiplication of the task-unit activation (Botvinick et al., 
2001), inhibiting the response layer and allowing the task-conflict to be resolved before the 
response is triggered. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------ 
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According to this account, task-conflict slowdown is expected to take place only for 
word (congruent or incongruent) but not for non-word (neutral) Stroop stimuli, as only word 
stimuli activate the task demand word-units in a bottom up fashion. Furthermore this 
slowdown is contingent on reduced proactive control (Figure 1, left panel), since only then 
the bottom up activation can overcome the mutual task-demand inhibition supported by top-
down control. As shown in the right panel of Figure 1, while under a high load the model 
predicts a regular facilitation effect (RT-congruent < RT-neutral), this is predicted to reverse 
under a low load (RT-congruent > RT-neutral; for parameters and computational details see 
Kalanthroff et al., 2015).  
While in our previous work (Kalanthroff et al, 2015), the reduced proactive control 
(which led to task-conflict and Stroop-RF) was due to a concurrent load, in our present task 
we aim to test if brief emotional distractors can also reduce proactive task control. As 
suggested by Wyble, Sharma, and Bowman (2008), emotional distractors may cause a shift 
from top-down mode to bottom-up mode, as a result from mutual inhibition between the 
dorsal and posterior ACC areas (e.g., Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). Crucially, based on ACT 
we expect that inhibitory control will be modulated by individual differences in the level of 
anxiety (Berggren et al., 2013). As shown by Derakshan et al (2009; Exp. 2), trait anxiety 
interferes with the ability to inhibit negative emotional cues in the antisaccade task.  
Here we used the Stroop task, which allows us to distinguish between task and 
response-conflict (as well as general slow-down) and we present emotional stimuli as 
irrelevant brief distractors that precede the Stroop stimuli; thus they affect proactive control 
rather than diverting attention from the relevant stimulus at hand. We predict that while low 
trait anxious participants will resolve the interference in favor of cognitive control (the 
proactive task-control remaining high and inhibiting the emotional distractor), high anxious 
participants, for which the emotional effects are more potent and who are more prone to 
bottom up processing will show reduced proactive task control. Thus, we expect that unlike 
the low anxious participants, who will able to inhibit the irrelevant emotional distractors, 
high anxious participants would have difficulty inhibiting the emotional impact of the prime 
pictures, resulting in bottom-up processing, enhancing both response and task conflict. In 
particular, we predict that both the Stroop interference (increased) and the Stroop facilitation 
(reversal) would be affected by a brief irrelevant emotional distractor in high anxious 
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participants, as shown in Figure 1 (right panel). To test these predictions we carried out a 
regular color-naming Stroop task, with each Stroop stimulus preceded by a brief emotional 
distractor (aversive vs. neutral), in low and high anxious participants. 
  
Method 
Participants. Fifty-two participants (26 in each of the low- and high-anxious groups) 
participated for a small monetary reward. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, no history of attention deficit or dyslexia, were native speakers of Hebrew, and all 
were naive as to the purpose of the experiment. All participants were recruited from an 
undergraduate university sample. The high trait anxious participants (HA) participants were 
initially screened using a survey with 4 items from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger et al., 1983) which was sent to approximately 3,230 undergraduate students (as 
part of a larger screening survey). Students who scored within the top 5% were invited to the 
lab by email to complete the full version of the STAI. All participants in the HA group had 
anxiety scores of 45 or above (for similar ranges see Georgiou et al., 2005), while low trait 
anxious participants (LA) had anxiety scores of 32 or below, on the state as well as the trait 
index of the STAI2.  
One LA participant was excluded due to an unusually high error rate (more than 50%) 
and one HA participant was excluded due to unusually long RTs (more than 2 standard 
deviations (SD) from the mean). Eventually there were 25 participants in each group (LA: 
17 females, mean age = 23.80 years (SD = 2.35, range: 21-32), STAI (state) = 25.28 (SD = 
2.07, range: 22-30, STAI (trait) = 26.20 (SD = 2.65, range: 21-31; HA: 20 females, mean 
age = 23.44 years (SD = 1.12, range: 21-26), STAI (state) = 52.08 (SD = 4.96, range: 45-66, 
STAI (trait) = 52.60 (SD = 5.55, range: 45-63). A power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that the current sample allowed for examination 
of the triple interaction (congruency X distractor-valance X group) at a power >90% to test 
small to medium effects size with a Type 1 error (α < 0.05). 
Materials. Each stimulus consisted of one of four Hebrew color words (equivalents 
of blue, red, green, and yellow)—or a four-letter string (parallel to XXXX in the English 
version). The print colors of the stimuli were red, blue, green or yellow. Eighty images (half 
of which were neutral and the other half negative) were selected from the IAPS database 
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(International Affective Picture System; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) based on 
Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007; see Supplementary Material A) (negative: mean valence 
= 2.41, mean arousal = 6.16; neutral: mean valence = 5.01, mean arousal = 2.84). The 
aversive pictures used in this study were selected so as to further maximize their emotional 
impact (low valence). The words and emotional distractor were presented at the center of a 
screen on a black background. The words were 2.5 cm high and 6 cm wide and the prime-
images were 7.4 cm high and 9.7 cm wide. 
Procedure. Data collection and stimuli presentation were controlled by a DELL 
OptiPlex 760 vPro computer with an Intel core 2 duo processor E8400 3 GHz. Stimuli were 
presented on a DELL E198PF 19’’ LCD monitor. Participants were tested individually and 
sat approximately 60 cm from the computer screen. The Stroop task started with 36 feedback 
practice trials. Subsequently, there were 144 experimental trials in which the three 
congruency conditions and the two valence conditions (neutral vs. negative) were equally 
presented and in a random order. Participants were instructed to respond (with their dominant 
hand) to the color of the word by pressing a set of adjacent keys (marked with colored 
stickers) on the keyboard. They were asked to ignore the meaning of the word and to press 
the correct color key as quickly and accurately as possible. Participants were told that the 
picture would appear but no action would be required (see Figure 2).  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
------------------------ 
Results  
Stroop task. Accuracy rates were high and no modulation by anxiety group or 
valence was found (see Table 1). We therefore focused our analysis on reaction times (RT). 
The mean RT for the correct responses as a function of distractor-valance and Stroop 
congruency is shown in Figure 3 and Table 1.  
--------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------- 
A 3 x 2 x 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out on the mean RT 
ANXIETY, EMOTIONAL DISTRACTORS AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL         9 
 
with congruency (congruent vs. neutral vs. incongruent) and valence (neutral vs. negative) 
as within-subjects factors and group (HA vs. LA) as a between-subjects factor. The results 
revealed the expected main effect of congruency (incongruent RT > neutral RT > congruent 
RT), which was significant, F (2, 96) = 47.38, MSE = 3,754.18, p < .001,  = .5; a main 
effect of picture valence (negative RT > neutral RT), F (1, 48) = 10.32, MSE = 1,602.17, p 
< .01,  = .18; and no significant effect of group (F < 1). Critical to our hypothesis, the 
triple interaction between congruency, valence, and group was significant, F (2, 96) = 3.22, 
MSE = 950.78, p = .04, = .06)3.  
In order to examine our a priori assumption and to investigate the triple interaction, 
we carried out two post-hoc planned ANOVAs with congruency and valence as within-
subjects factors, for HA and LA groups separately. In the LA, we only found a main effect 
of congruency, F (2, 48) = 21.77, MSE = 4,489.38, p < .001,  = .48; and no main effect for 
picture valence. F (1, 24) = 1.27, MSE = 1,615.22, p = .27, nor an interaction between 
congruency and valence, F (2, 48) = 2.54, MSE = 1,217.82, p >.1. Post-hoc analyses revealed 
that there were no effects of the aversive emotional distractor for any of the congruency 
conditions (p > .1 for all analyses) nor for the facilitation or interference effects. Thus, for 
the low-anxiety group the negative emotional distractors had little or no effect on task 
performance in each congruency condition (Table 1). 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 here 
------------------------ 
 For the HA, we also found a main effect of congruency, F (2, 48) = 27.65, MSE = 
3,018.97, p < .001,  = .535. However, in contrast to the LA, we also found a main effect 
of valence, F (1, 24) = 11.75, MSE = 1,589.13, p < .01,  = .33, and an interaction between 
congruency and valence, F (2, 48) = 4.86, MSE = 783.73, p = .01,  = .17. This interaction 
was due to a slowdown following an aversive (compared with neutral) distractor for the 
congruent, t(24) = 3.03, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .61, and the incongruent conditions, t(24) = 
3.86, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.77, but not for the neutral condition, t(24) < 1, p = .7. Thus, as 
predicted by our model (Figure 1), for the high-anxiety group we found that negative 
emotional distractors reduced performance when control was needed, resulting in a larger 
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interference, t(24) = 2.89, p < 0.1, Cohen’s d =.60, and a smaller (and even reversed) 
facilitation effect, t(24) = 2.01, p < .05, Cohen’s d =.42 (see Figure 3; compare with Figure 
1; right panel).  
 
Discussion 
We examined how trait anxiety influences the impact of irrelevant briefly flashed 
(aversive vs. neutral) distracters in the Stroop task. As the emotional distracters were task-
irrelevant and did not compete directly with the task-stimuli we were able to investigate the 
effect of emotional distracters that precede the task on proactive control processes. The 
results showed that while the negative emotional distractor had little effect on the Stroop-RT 
in low trait anxious participants, they had a significant effect in high trait anxious participants 
resulting in a slowdown after negative emotional distractors, for both congruent and 
incongruent Stroop stimuli, but not for neutral Stroop stimuli. 
The lack of an emotion-valence effect on incongruent trials in low anxious 
participants extends the results from our pilot experiment (see Supplementary Material B) 
and converges with previous results (Cohen et al., 2011) where no effect of distractor-valance 
on incongruent flanker trials was found in an unselected sample of participants not defined 
by their levels of anxiety4. Extending the interpretation put forward by Cohen et al. (2011), 
our results suggest that participants scoring at low or medium ranges on measures of anxiety 
are often able to recruit executive control to inhibit the aversive impact of task-irrelevant 
stimuli. These results are also consistent with those of Derakshan et al. (2009, Exp. 2), who 
found no increase in the antisaccade-RT for angry (compared with neutral) cues. Recent 
neuroscientific evidence provides a potential neural mechanism for the inhibition of the task-
irrelevant distractors in low anxiety participants (Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 
2006). Using a modified Stroop task with emotional material, Etkin et al., have reported a 
top-down inhibition from a conflict-resolution area (rostral cingulate) to emotional conflict 
areas (right amygdala). The results, however, differ from those of Hart et al. (2010), in which 
a slowdown after aversive emotional distractor was found on Stroop incongruent trials. The 
reason for this difference may relate to individual differences, as the participants’ anxiety 
level was not reported (see below), as well as some procedural differences that may have 
made proactive control in the task weaker than in the present study, and thus more vulnerable 
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to emotional interference.  
For high trait anxious participants, however, we found a specific slowdown in both 
incongruent and congruent (but not in neutral) Stroop trials, after negative (compared with 
neutral) emotional distractors (see also Hart et al., 2010). This slowdown indicates that in 
high trait anxious participants, the emotional distractors disrupted proactive control, as 
predicted by the proactive-control/task-conflict model (Kalanthroff, et al., 2015). These 
results are also consistent with, and extend the basic tenets of ACT (Berggren & Derakshan, 
2013a; Eysenck et al., 2007), where anxiety is believed to bias the attentional system in favor 
of bottom-up processing over top-down control exaggerating the impact of emotional 
(threat-related) stimuli (Derakshan et al. 2009) and concurrent load (Berggren et. al., 2013) 
on working memory. Finally, our results are consistent with the dual competition model, 
according to which there is a common and limited resource of emotional and executive 
control processes (Pessoa, 2009), as well as fitting in with biased competition models of 
attention (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), where the competition between task-relevant control 
process and the transient activation triggered by the emotional distractor is expected to be 
exacerbated in individuals high in anxiety. (Iordan et al., 2013). 
The current results have specific implications for the field of executive control as 
well as for the field of emotion-regulation, in particular emotional disorders such as anxiety 
and depression. It is noteworthy to mention that emotional distractibility was not apparent 
as a general slowing down of RT (Algom, Chajut & Lev, 2004; Tipples & Sharma, 2000), as 
we found no slowdown in the Stroop neutral condition after aversive distractors in high 
anxiety participants (Table 1). Rather the slow down we found here was specific to the 
incongruent and congruent conditions. While the former can reflect the familiar response-
conflict, the latter likely indicates task-conflict (both congruent and incongruent conditions 
are subject to a conflict between the relevant task of color-naming and the irrelevant but 
automatic one of word-reading). Due to the efficiency of the task control mechanisms (e.g., 
Glodfarb & Henik, 2007; La Heij & Boelens, 2011), task conflict is commonly not evident 
in the Stroop task and thus commonly ignored. As depicted in our computational model 
(Figure 1, right panel), task-conflict, as indicated by increased interference and reverse 
facilitation, is an outcome of reduced proactive task-control, an effect only found in high 
anxious individuals, due to biased emotional processing in favor of the emotional stimulus 
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reducing proactive task control, compromising on performance outcome. Our results extend 
previous findings (see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013a for a review) suggesting that anxiety 
is associated with difficulties in filtering the impact of a prior emotional event on subsequent 
task processing demands. Here, it is likely that trait anxious individuals held the negatively 
laden task irrelevant information in working memory to subsequently impair their 
performance on a task that required the efficient regulation of prefrontal mechanisms of 
inhibitory control. It is for future research to understand the causal mechanisms behind 
anxiety based impairments in filtering task irrelevant negative information. Such 
impairments are most likely due to reduce processing efficiency of attentional control. The 
adverse effects of excessive emotional processing and its pre-occupation in working 
memory, that is needed for efficiency in day to day functioning, can result in unwanted 
consequences that will in turn be erroneously attributed to one’s own efficacy. Such common 
difficulties in the regulation and execution of prefrontal mechanisms of control when 
exposed to negative information may impair the quality of life of anxious individuals over 
and above the effect of anxiety over the emotional system and attention. Future studies may 
also examine possible ways in which attentional control can be enhanced to reduce the 
impact of threat related material in working memory (see Sari, Koster, Pourtois, & 
Derakshan, under review).  
The results of the current investigation pave the way for more refined methods and 
theoretical directions that may be explored in future studies, to also address some of the 
limitations of the present investigation. To further maximize their emotional impact, the 
aversive pictures used in the current study were of low valence and high arousal, identical 
to previous studies that investigated the effect of emotional valence on the executive system 
(i.e., Kalanthorff, Cohen, & Henik, 2013; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007; Hart et al., 2010). 
Future research should clarify the attributed effects to dimensions of valence and arousal. 
Given that trait anxiety is an important vulnerability factor in the development of clinical 
anxiety levels with deleterious effects on every day functioning, it will be helpful to also 
extend the current investigation to a clinical sample of anxious participants. Finally, it will 
be interesting to examine how attentional control in low anxious individuals is affected by 
emotional distractors in more ecological situations, such as those where the emotional 
stimuli are rare or unexpected (e.g., emergency sounds, or a case where one hears one’s own 
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name). An attractive hypothesis is that emotional stimuli generate a switch from a top-down 
task-control mode to a bottom-up processing mode that facilitates the processing of the 
salient emotional stimulus at the expense of top down control (Wyble et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, attentional capture by emotional distracters will be evident even in low anxious 
participants under such conditions. 
In conclusion, in line with the predictions of our proactive task-control model, we 
found that emotional distractors reduce proactive task control in trait anxious individuals. 
We conclude that while low anxious participants can filter out emotional distracters, 
maintaining intact task control, anxious individuals show difficulty filtering out emotional 
distracters and are thus impaired in their executive (task) control. 
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Footnotes 
1The main difference is that in our study the frequency of congruent, incongruent 
and neutral Stroop stimuli was equal, while in Hart et al.’s study 66% of the stimuli were 
neutral. 
 
2 Participants also completed a number of additional anxiety related questionnaires 
that are not reported here. 
 
3The two-way interactions were not reported since they were qualified by the triple-
interaction and were not at the center of this investigation. 
 
4In Cohen et al. (2011), an effect of negative emotional distractor was found in 
congruent trials. This, however was a flanker-task, which unlike the Stroop task does not 
involve task-control for congruent stimuli.  
















Figure 1 (adopted from Kalanthroff, Avnit, Henik, Davelaar, & Usher, 2015). Left: A 
schematic model demonstrating the work of two task-control units in the Stroop task, which 
project and receive projection from sensory layers. Task-conflict is represented by the flash-
event and it inhibits the response units. The task demand units are modulated by a proactive 
control (PC) circuit associated with the Anterior Cingulate (AC; Botvinick, et al, 2001). The 
numbers in the figure represent weights for the different connections, which are stronger for 
word-reading (2.5) compared to color-naming (2), indicating automaticity of the former. 
Right: Model predictions for facilitation and interference under high and low proactive task-
control (emotional) load. 
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Figure 2. Example of a negative emotional distractor incongruent Stroop experimental trial. 
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 1,000 ms, followed by a prime 
stimulus that was presented for 100ms. Fifty ms after the disappearance of the emotional 
distractor the Stroop stimulus appeared. The visual stimulus stayed in view for 2,000ms or 
until a key-press. 
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Figure 3. Results of the emotional Stroop task as a function of group and emotional 
distractor valence. Results revealed that the for the low anxiety group, distractor-valence 
did not affect task performance in any congruency condition, whereas for the high anxiety 
group, negative emotional distractors resulted in reduced facilitation (neutral RT minus 
congruent RT) and increased interference (incongruent RT minus neutral RT) whereas 
neutral trials were not affected. Error bars represent one standard error from the mean. * - 
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Table 1  














Note: Mean RTs ± 95% confidence intervals, (standard error of the means), and [accuracy 
rate] under the different congruency conditions of the emotional Stroop task. 
 Task congruency 
 
Valence Congruent Neutral Incongruent 
 
Low anxiety    
Neutral 652±28 (14) [.96] 663±33 (16) [.95] 722±50 (24) [.96] 
Negative 642±26 (13) [.93] 676±32 (16) [.95] 742±54 (26) [.94] 
High anxiety    
Neutral 659±35 (17) [.95] 670±35 (17) [.96] 723±42 (20) [.97] 
Negative 684±37 (18) [.98] 673±38 (18) [.97] 762±42 (20) [.95] 
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